Terminating in the name of eBPF

Shutting down Podman containers offending against Seccomp

Tuebix 2023 Lightning Talk by Cedric Casper

What's the goal? Taking Seccomp security a bit further

- Podman containers can be started with Seccomp profiles
 - Nice way to reduce attack surface
- When a process inside the container offends against the Seccomp profile...
 - ...not only the process should be terminated...
 - ...but also the whole container!


Why? Taking Seccomp security a bit further

- Currently only processes inside the container are blocked by Seccomp
 - Parent process is still running...
 - ...and so, the container is still running.
- Malware or attacker inside the container could still try out other attack methods, allowed System Calls, overseen System Calls, ...
- We wanted the container and therefore potential threats to be shut down for good.

One way of doing it Using eBPF to spot Seccomp offences

- Writing a program, using Python and BCC [1]
- Tracing exited processes and filtering/checking:
 - How did it exit? (Checking for Signal 31 and abnormal exit)
 - Did it use Seccomp? (exited_process->seccomp.mode == 2 or 3)
- Getting info on the container:
 - Container owner UID = owner of the Seccomp violating process' PID namespace
 - PID namespace ID as container identifier
- Shutting down the container:
 - Sudo-ing into the user, listing Podman containers filtered by previously determined PID namespace ID
 - -> podman kill <container ID>





4 1st of July, 2023 | Tuebix 2023 | Cedric Casper

Program flow

Result

- Bonus filters and infos:
 - Only shutdown container(s) of certain users or groups
 - Only shutdown certain container(s)
 - Get command that violated the Seccomp profile -> adjusting/debugging the Seccomp profile
 - And probably many more...
- After the Seccomp offence inside a container, that container is shut down
- -> Threat is reduced, the incident can be investigated

Code available on Github: https://github.com/hashkeks/seccomSurv

ubuntu@hfu-demo:~\$ sudo ./seccompSurv.py -v -	<pre>john_titor@hfu-demo:~\$ podman runsecurity-opt s eccomp=seccomp profiles/bash.json -ti fedora:30 ba</pre>
# Preparing eBPF program	sh
f Done preparing eBPF prog.	[root@e4039a806ec5 /]# ls
# Start tracing seccomp violations	
# Mode: pidns	boot home lost+found opt run sys var
	dev lib media proc sbin <mark>tmp</mark>
# Only monitoring containers of user: 1003	[root@e4039a806ec5 /]# cat /etc/fedora-release
	Fedora release 30 (Thirty)
# Potential Seccomp violation spotted.	[root@e4039a806ec5 /]# rm /etc/fedora-release
f Issued command: rm	rm: remove symbolic link '/etc/fedora-release'? y
‡ Real UID and GID: 1003 1003	Bad system call (core dumped)
# Mapped UID and GID: 1003 1003	[root@e4039a806ec5 /]# john_titor@hfu-demo:~\$
# Looking for user with UID: 1003	
# User with UID 1003 has username john_titor	
# Found container(s):	
‡ ['e4039a806ec5']	
f Stopping container(s) with ID(s):	
f ['e4039a806ec5']	
Looking for user with UID: 1003	
User with UID 1003 has username john_titor	
Killed podman container(s) with ID(s) e4039	
a806ec5	
1000ec5	

Example of a spotted Seccomp offence, followed by container shutdown

Thank you!

For more information feel free to write me:

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