

# TCP Stealth

## Port Knocking Advanced

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# Agenda

- Who & Why
- A Bit of History
- The Idea
- Implementation
- Show
- And?



# Who & Why

# Me :-)

- Teacher of mathematics and physics
- PhD in experimental physics
- Started with Linux in 1996
- Linux/UNIX trainer
- s+c: 2002-2005
- @Amadeus:
  - Linux Admin, Strategy, Automation
  - Architecture & Technical Governance



# My 'notebook' :-D

- Raspberry Pi2
- Fedora 21 with custom kernel
- HDMI2VGA
- Mini Bluetooth keyboard
- 10 Ah battery



# Why not?

- Security by obscurity
- Port knocking daemon – SPOF
- IP address spoofing
- ... and more



# Why?

- Brute force login attacks
- Technical evolution
- Snowden disclosures
  - Computer power
  - Country-wide port-scans



# A Bit of History

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# Looking back and around

- Not new
- Several implementations
- Normally 3 parties
- 'Knocking' differences
- E.g. <http://www.portknocking.org/>




# Traditional Port Knocking Procedure

- I. Connection attempt by client to server  
=> blocked by firewall
- II. Knock sequence performed by client  
=> verified by Port Knocking daemon
- III. Port-Knocking daemon instructs  
firewall
- IV. 2<sup>nd</sup> Connection attempt by client  
=> granted by firewall



# Traditional Port Knocking Setup



# Further downsides of Traditional Port Knocking


- Additional network packets
- Man-in-the-Middle attacks
- Protocol-dependent port behaviour



# The Idea

# TCP only!?!

- Well-used
- UDP limitations, e.g syslog, DNS
- Widely used for TLS/SSL




# First Thoughts

- Avoid additional packets
- Hide information in protocol header
  - 'Steganography'
  - Limitations per design
  - RFC 793 (and successors)
- Shared Secret
- Not new => Silentknock (1997)



# TCP Header – potential candidates



- Initial Sequence Number (ISN)
- Acknowledgement Number (ACK)?
- Timestamps?



# ISN as a Carrier Medium

- 32 Bit
- Input data
  - Shared Secret
  - Target IP
  - Target Port
  - Time
- Generation via MD5



# Implementation

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# About Sockets

- Change of TCP implementation
- Client AND Server
- Linux/BSD
  - Kernel
    - `tcp_v4/6_connect()`
    - `tcp_v4/6_do_rcv()`
  - Application
    - `setsockopt()`



# Linux Kernel with TCP Stealth

```
.config - Linux/x86 3.18.0 Kernel Configuration
Networking support  Networking options

Networking options
Arrow keys navigate the menu. <Enter> selects submenus ---> (or
empty submenus ----). Highlighted letters are hotkeys. Pressing
<Y> includes, <N> excludes, <M> modularizes features. Press
<Esc><Esc> to exit, <?> for Help, </> for Search. Legend: [*]
(-)
[*] TCP: advanced congestion control --->
[*] TCP: MD5 Signature Option support (RFC2385)
[*] TCP: Stealth TCP socket support
<*> The IPv6 protocol --->
[*] NetLabel subsystem support
(+)

<Select>  <Exit >  <Help >  <Save >  <Load >
```

# Socket changes for closed source

- Helper library
  - *libknockify*
  - *LD\_PRELOAD*
  - Overlay of system calls
    - `listen()`
    - `connect()`
- A bit flaky
- Not recommended => 'just a hack'



# Stealth Socket Example

```
$ cat tcp_stealth_server.c
```

```
...
```

```
#define TCP_STEALTH                26
```

```
...
```

```
    char secret[64] = "This is my magic ID.";
```

```
...
```

```
    if (setsockopt(sock, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_STEALTH, secret,  
sizeof(secret)) {  
        printf("setsockopt() failed, %s\n", strerror(errno));  
        return 1;  
    }
```

```
...
```

```
$
```

# Man in the Middle .. Still possible!?!

- Duty of application .. yes .. but ..
- Small but real attack vector
- Data integrity check!!




# TCP Stealth – Data Integrity Check I

- Input data
  - PSK
  - Additional information
- MD5
- Split and XOR => 16 Bit
- 2<sup>nd</sup> part of ISN :-)





# TCP Stealth - Data Integrity Check II



# TCP Stealth – Retransmissions

- Traditional TCP => new timestamp
- TCP Stealth
  - Timestamp => ISN calculation
  - Use same/old timestamp



Show


# Example – The Scene

- Patched Linux kernel 3.19rc1
- Patched SSHD with TCP Stealth enabled
- Configured as service using port 10022

```
#  
# uname -r  
3.19.0-rc1  
#  
# cat /etc/systemd/system/sshd-knock.service  
[Unit]  
Description=Knockified OpenSSH server daemon  
After=network.target sshd-keygen.service  
Wants=sshd-keygen.service  
  
[Service]  
EnvironmentFile=/etc/sysconfig/ssh  
ExecStart=/usr/local/sbin/sshd -D $OPTIONS  
ExecReload=/bin/kill -HUP $MAINPID  
KillMode=process  
Restart=on-failure  
RestartSec=42s  
  
[Install]  
WantedBy=multi-user.target  
#  
#  
# █
```

# Example – The Show

- <http://youtu.be/7CadOVTNxr4> :-)



And?

# Bits and Pieces

- Not part of Vanilla kernel
  - First trial in DEC 2013
  - Last one in DEC 2014
- No plans by Linux distributors
  - True for Enterprise
  - Not true for Knoppix :-)
- IETF discussions
  - Not using ISN
  - Using TSval/TSecr



# Summary

- Promising project
- Good documentation
- Addresses known challenges
- Upstream integration outstanding





# References

- <http://gnunet.org/knock>
- [http://gnunet.org/sites/default/files/ma\\_kirsch\\_2014\\_0.pdf](http://gnunet.org/sites/default/files/ma_kirsch_2014_0.pdf)
- <http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-kirsch-ietf-tcp-stealth-00>
- <http://github.com/useidel/knock>



Thank you!

# TCP Stealth

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